Full Report
Figures converted from IDR to USD at historical FX rates (frankfurter.app). Monetary statements are shown in US$ millions; per-share figures use the matching period rate. Filing links open the native figures from which each USD value was derived.
The numbers behind PT Erajaya Swasembada Tbk: as-reported financial statements and company metrics for FY2021–FY2025, traced to the source filings, opened with the share-price history those statements have to justify. Every linked USD figure opens the exact filing row containing the native reported value from which it was converted. Amounts in US$ millions unless noted.
Reading notes: All figures are as printed by the filings, in thousands of Rupiah (the presentation unit stated on every statement page: 'Expressed in Thousands of Rupiah, Unless Otherwise Stated'). Per-share amounts are in full Rupiah. FY2023-FY2025 figures are cited to Erajaya's standalone audited consolidated financial statements for each year (filed on IDX and indexed under quarterly_reports/Q4_FY20xx); FY2021 and FY2022 are cited to the financial-statement section of those years' annual reports. Both are the same audited statements - the standalone filings were used where the indexed text is cleanest. Erajaya's annual filings print two years per statement, so each fiscal year in the tab is cited to its own filing rather than to a comparative column. Expense, tax and outflow lines are recorded negative because the filings print them in parentheses.
Share Price — Available History Since April 2026
The stock closed at $0.02 on Jul 28, 2026 — down 2% over the window shown, trading between $0.02 and $0.02.
Source: market price feed, daily closes, Apr 2026–Jul 2026 — the feed marks this available history as partial. Price return only, excludes dividends. Prices converted from IDR to USD with date-matched or nearest-available FX.
FY2025 at a Glance
Revenue (US$ millions)
Operating income (US$ millions)
Net income (US$ millions)
Source: FY2025 consolidated statements [1] [2] [3] [4]. Click any linked figure to open the filing page with the row highlighted.
Net Sales by Product Segment
| Net Sales by Product Segment | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cellular phones and tablets | 2,405 | 2,514 | 3,114 | 3,251 | 3,604 |
| Operator products | 245 | 184 | 189 | 104 | 93 |
| Computer and other electronic devices | 135 | 140 | 154 | 164 | 183 |
| Accessories and others | 258 | 377 | 451 | 529 | 716 |
| Total external sales | 3,043 | 3,216 | 3,909 | 4,047 | 4,596 |
Source: Notes to the consolidated financial statements - Segment Information (external sales) [5] [6] [7] [8]. Click any linked figure to open the filing page with the row highlighted.
Gross Profit by Product Segment
| Gross Profit by Product Segment | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cellular phones and tablets | 250 | 238 | 299 | 309 | 318 |
| Operator products | 5 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 5 |
| Computer and other electronic devices | 13 | 14 | 12 | 13 | 13 |
| Accessories and others | 68 | 91 | 103 | 126 | 166 |
| Total gross profit per segment | 336 | 349 | 419 | 451 | 501 |
Source: Notes to the consolidated financial statements - Segment Information (gross profit per segment) [5] [6] [7] [8]. Click any linked figure to open the filing page with the row highlighted.
Income Statement
Source: Consolidated Statement of Profit or Loss and Other Comprehensive Income [1] [2] [3] [4]. Click any linked figure to open the filing page with the row highlighted.
Columns marked E are consensus analyst estimates from analyst consensus, shown alongside reported results for direct comparison; they are not company guidance.
Estimate source: analyst consensus (claude_web), as of 2026-07-29. Forecasts carry no filing page links.
Balance Sheet
Source: Consolidated Statement of Financial Position [9] [10] [11] [12]. Click any linked figure to open the filing page with the row highlighted.
Cash Flow
Source: Consolidated Statement of Cash Flows [13] [14] [15] [16]. Click any linked figure to open the filing page with the row highlighted.
Net Sales by Geographic Area
| Net Sales by Geographic Area | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Central area | 2,037 | 2,041 | 2,164 | 2,422 | 2,749 |
| East area | 238 | 277 | 395 | 438 | 499 |
| West area | 767 | 897 | 1,350 | 1,187 | 1,348 |
| Total net sales | 3,043 | 3,216 | 3,909 | 4,047 | 4,596 |
Source: Notes to the consolidated financial statements - Segment Information (customer location: West = Sumatra and Java; Central = Jabodetabek, Kalimantan, Singapore and Malaysia; East = the remainder) [5] [6] [7] [8]. Click any linked figure to open the filing page with the row highlighted.
Long-Term Record
| Fiscal year | Net sales | Operating profit | Profit attributable to owners of the parent company | Basic earnings per share (full amount) | Net cash provided by operating activities | Total equity |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FY2016 | 1,438 | 37 | 18 | — | 102 | 239 |
| FY2017 | 1,696 | 42 | 24 | — | (54) | 259 |
| FY2018 | 2,432 | 107 | 60 | — | (170) | 338 |
| FY2019 | 2,306 | 54 | 21 | — | 170 | 349 |
| FY2020 | 2,388 | 77 | 43 | 0.00 | 200 | 398 |
| FY2021 | 3,043 | 116 | 71 | 0.00 | 2 | 452 |
| FY2022 | 3,216 | 117 | 66 | 0.00 | 28 | 468 |
| FY2023 | 3,909 | 120 | 54 | 0.00 | 57 | 529 |
| FY2024 | 4,047 | 132 | 64 | 0.00 | 139 | 562 |
| FY2025 | 4,596 | 146 | 72 | 0.00 | 14 | 611 |
Source: consolidated statements across filings; older years from the standardized feed [14] [1] [2] [9]. Click any linked figure to open the filing page with the row highlighted.
Operating KPIs
| KPI | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Number of retail outlets | 1,218 | 1,689 | 2,049 | 2,194 | 2,333 |
| Depreciation and amortization | 38 | 42 | 59 | 71 | 83 |
Source: company-reported operating metrics [5] [6] [7] [17]. Click any linked figure to open the filing page with the row highlighted.
Analyst Consensus
Street ratings: Strong Buy. StockAnalysis.com (July 2026): 8 analysts — 6 Strong Buy, 1 Buy, 1 Hold, 0 Sell, 0 Strong Sell; mean 12-month target 504.29 IDR (low 400, high 680), +30.6% vs 386 IDR. Investing.com concurs: mean 504 IDR, 7 Buy / 1 Hold / 0 Sell, "Strong Buy". Broader local (Bloomberg-sourced) coverage is wider and slightly more bullish: Kontan cites 17 analysts (16 Buy / 1 Hold) with a mean target of Rp537.22; TradingView shows only 4 recent raters (450-500 IDR). Consensus is uniformly bullish with no sell ratings from any source.
Estimate source: analyst consensus (claude_web), as of 2026-07-29. Forecasts carry no filing page links.
Traceability
437 of 457 figures on this page (96%) link to the filing page containing the native reported figure from which the USD value was converted — click a linked figure to open that source row. Unlinked figures come from standardized data feeds or pre-filing years.
All figures are as printed by the filings, in thousands of Rupiah (the presentation unit stated on every statement page: 'Expressed in Thousands of Rupiah, Unless Otherwise Stated'). Per-share amounts are in full Rupiah.
FY2023-FY2025 figures are cited to Erajaya's standalone audited consolidated financial statements for each year (filed on IDX and indexed under quarterly_reports/Q4_FY20xx); FY2021 and FY2022 are cited to the financial-statement section of those years' annual reports. Both are the same audited statements - the standalone filings were used where the indexed text is cleanest.
Erajaya's annual filings print two years per statement, so each fiscal year in the tab is cited to its own filing rather than to a comparative column.
Expense, tax and outflow lines are recorded negative because the filings print them in parentheses.
FY2016-FY2019 long-term figures come from the standardized data feed (data/financials/*.json) and carry no page links; FY2020 is cited to the comparative column of the FY2021 Annual Report. Basic EPS is left blank for FY2016-FY2019 because those years predate the 2021 five-for-one stock split (par value Rp500 to Rp100) and the feed reports them on the pre-split share basis.
The numeric feed agrees with the filings on every checked FY2021-FY2025 line (feed values are full Rupiah, i.e. 1,000x the printed thousands). The entries in 'discrepancies' are filing-versus-filing restatements, not feed conflicts.
Quarterly income-statement and cash-flow figures are single quarters derived from the printed year-to-date statements; Indonesian interim filings present cumulative periods only. Quarterly balance-sheet figures are point-in-time and cited directly. No quarterly cash-flow feed file exists in this run, so the derived quarters could not be cross-checked against a provider series.
Q4 FY24 and Q4 FY25 are derived from the audited full-year statements less the nine-month interim statements.
5 figure(s) differed between the data feed and the filing; the filing value is shown (see the run's metrics/metrics_tab.json for the audit trail).
PT Erajaya Swasembada Tbk's management explains the business in its own materials. The slides below do the most of that work, pulled from the documents preserved in Sources. Each source link opens the complete presentation at that slide in a new tab.
Company Update — 1Q 2026 Financial Statements — 1Q 2026
The current company update: what each vertical is, how the store network is built, and the latest P&L, segment mix and unit economics. · Open the full document →
Company Update — Audited Financial Statements FY2025 — FY 2025
The audited full-year 2025 picture: annual P&L, segment mix, working capital and the volume-versus-price series at full-year scale. · Open the full document →
Company Update FY 2024 — FY 2024
The last overview-style deck: company history, national footprint, the market-share record, and each vertical with its gross margin. · Open the full document →
More from management
Paparan Publik / Public Expose 2026 — 1Q 2026 · 15 pages · The annual IDX public expose, in Indonesian: the same 1Q26 numbers plus a group-at-a-glance page and the conservation and e-waste work. · Open →
Company Update — 9M 2025 — 9M 2025 · 22 pages · The deck just before the iPhone 17 quarter — the -1.7% same-store trough that the FY2025 rebound is measured against. · Open →
Corporate Presentation — 1H 2023 — 1H 2023 · 20 pages · The 2023 corporate deck: the ERAL subsidiary IPO rationale and valuation, and the Malaysia and Singapore store build-out in detail. · Open →
PT Erajaya Swasembada Tbk's annual reports contain management's most considered account of the business. These are the sections, passages and visual pages worth opening in the originals preserved in Sources.
PT Erajaya Swasembada Tbk — 2025 Annual Report (Laporan Tahunan) — FY2025
The latest full-year account: 2,333 outlets, Rp76.6tn of sales at a 10.9% gross margin, and the year operating cash flow nearly vanished. · Open the full document →
LAPORAN DIREKSI / REPORT OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTOR — p. 22 · Read the full section →
Management's own account of 2025 — where the 'Consciously Grow' stance came from and how a supplier's calendar moved the year.
The President Director on how Apple's launch calendar reshaped the sales year.
Beyond market-related challenges, Management also faced operational challenges associated with principal business dynamics. The rescheduling of Apple’s key product launches from October 2024 to April 2025 was managed through careful inventory oversight and proactive marketing strategies. As a result, by applying the principle of prudence the Company achieved a significant surge in sales growth during the first half of 2025 immediately after the products became available in the market. This demonstrates Erajaya’s capability to maintain growth momentum even amid shifts in the global product cycle.
p. 24 · Read in context →
SEKILAS TENTANG ERAJAYA / ERAJAYA AT GLANCE — p. 32 · Read the full section →
The business in its own words: an import-distribute-retail chain whose shelf space is rented from other people's brands.
Scale and the principal roster the whole model rests on.
As of December 31, 2025, Erajaya Group continues to expand its network and service reach, operating 2,333 outlets in various cities throughout Indonesia. To ensure service quality, the Company continues to develop strategic partnerships with well-known brands, including Apple, Asus, DJI, Garmin, Google, GoPro, Huawei, Infinix Nokia, Oppo, Realme, Samsung, Vivo, Xiaomi, Hono among others. Erajaya Group also collaborates with leading cellular network operators in Indonesia to distribute their products.
p. 32 · Read in context →
Three verticals in FY2025 — Beauty & Wellness, named in FY2024, is gone.
In addition to strengthening partnership strategies, the Company implements a customer-centric business strategy by actively expanding its business lines through vertical businesses: Erajaya Digital, which focuses on 3C products (Communication, Computers, and Consumer Electronics); Erajaya Active Lifestyle, which focuses on lifestyle-related products and accessories, including IoT devices, accessories, and sports fashion apparel; and Erajaya Food & Nourishment, which focuses on products in the Food, Beverages, & Supermarket sector.
p. 33 · Read in context →
BIDANG USAHA / LINE OF BUSINESS — p. 36 · Read the full section →
Where the newest diversifications are booked — XPENG electric vehicles and a drone-show operator, both outside consumer electronics.
Two 2025 additions to the line of business: EV distribution and drone shows.
The Company operates in the automotive industry sector, focusing on four-wheeled electric vehicles under the global XPENG brand in Indonesia. This business is conducted in collaboration with third parties and managed by PT Era Industri Otomotif. […] The Company also operates in the creative and advertising sector, focusing on the organization of drone show performances for promotional, event, and visual campaign purposes.
p. 38 · Read in context →
TINJAUAN INDUSTRI / INDUSTRY REVIEW — p. 67 · Read the full section →
The demand backdrop management is underwriting: premiumisation, GenAI handsets, and the regulatory gate that reopened iPhone sales.
Indonesia's 2025 handset market and the March 2025 TKDN clearance for the iPhone 16.
The Indonesian smartphone market in 2025 demonstrates strong resilience, with shipment volumes projected to exceed the 40 million unit threshold. This growth is driven by the acceleration of the “premiumization” trend and the massive adoption of Generative AI (GenAI) technology, which has now become the new standard for mid-to high-end devices. The shift in consumer preferences from mere hardware specifications toward AI functionality— such as real-time translation features and advanced digital assistants—provides significant added value to the digital retail ecosystem, particularly in boosting the average selling price (ASP) in the national market. […] experienced a significant rebound following the normalization of supply and the official sales approval of the iPhone 16 series in March 2025 after meeting the 40% Local Content Requirement (TKDN).
p. 67 · Read in context →
TINJAUAN OPERASIONAL / OPERATIONAL REVIEW — p. 69 · Read the full section →
Where the money is actually made: banner-by-banner store counts, and the segment gross margins behind a 10.9% blended rate.
TINJAUAN KEUANGAN / FINANCIAL OVERVIEW — p. 75 · Read the full section →
The income statement walk — sales up 17.4% while selling and distribution costs rose 27.8%, compressing the gross margin.
Selling and distribution expenses grew faster than sales.
Sales and distribution expenses increased by 27.8% from Rp2,995.87 billion to Rp3,829.16 billion. This increase was primarily caused by the increase of payroll expenses, depreciation of right-of-use assets, and advertising and promotional costs, which collectively increased by Rp586.28 billion or 30.3%.
p. 78 · Read in context →
LAPORAN ARUS KAS KONSOLIDASIAN / STATEMENT OF CONSOLIDATED CASH FLOWS — p. 78 · Read the full section →
The year's sharpest number: operating cash flow fell from Rp2,239bn to Rp225bn even as profit rose 17.3%.
Cash from customers rose Rp10.8tn; net operating cash flow fell 89.9%.
The Company recorded cash flows from operating activities consisting of cash receipts from customers amounting to Rp76,266.37 billion (2024: Rp65,461.88 billion). In addition, there were cash receipts from interest income amounting to Rp46.09 billion (2024: Rp38.29 billion). […] Meanwhile, cash used in operating activities consisted of cash payments to suppliers and employees totaling Rp74,945.44 billion.
Net cash provided by operating activities as of the end of 2025 amounting to Rp225.15 billion (2024: Rp2,239.32 billion).
p. 79 · Read in context →
KEMAMPUAN MEMBAYAR UTANG DAN TINGKAT KOLEKTABILITAS PIUTANG / SOLVENCY AND RECEIVABLES COLLECTIBILITY — p. 79 · Read the full section →
The balance-sheet cost of the expansion: current ratio down to 1.16x and debt-to-equity up from 1.40x to 1.84x.
Current liabilities outgrew current assets; the cash ratio fell to 0.12x.
The current ratio decreased from 1.22x in 2024 to 1.16x due to a 57.75% increase in current liabilities, while current assets increased by only 49.49% compared to the previous year. Meanwhile, the cash ratio decreased from 0.16x to 0.12x due to relatively stable cash and cash equivalents.
p. 79 · Read in context →
Leverage: liabilities up 46.88% against equity up 12.36%.
The debt-to-equity ratio stood at 1.84x, higher than 1.40x in 2024. Meanwhile, the debt-to-assets ratio was 0.65x, higher than 0.58x in the previous year. This increase occurred due to the increase in the Company’s liabilities by 46.88% and the increase in assets by 32.53%. Meanwhile, equity only increased by 12.36%.
p. 80 · Read in context →
SISTEM MANAJEMEN RISIKO / RISK MANAGEMENT SYSTEM — p. 128 · Read the full section →
Two risks specific to this importer: FX on stock bought in dollars, and import rules that can strand premium inventory.
FX on imported goods plus the 12% VAT step-up, and the IMEI/TKDN import regime.
Global economic uncertainty, which impacts fluctuations in the Rupiah exchange rate against the US Dollar, remains a key risk, considering that the majority of electronic products marketed are imported goods or contain cost components denominated in foreign currencies. In 2025, additional pressure arose from the potential decline in consumer purchasing power due to the adjustment of the Value Added Tax (VAT) rate to 12%, which began to be widely implemented. […] The Company operates within a dynamic regulatory framework, including policies on import trade procedures, IMEI registration, and Domestic Component Level (TKDN) requirements. Changes in import regulations (such as non-tariff restrictions) in 2025 may affect the availability of premium product inventory across the Company's retail network.
p. 128 · Read in context →
PT Erajaya Swasembada Tbk — 2024 Annual Report (Laporan Tahunan) — FY2024
Featured for one contrast: FY2024 describes four verticals and lists banners — Wellings, The Face Shop, Sushi Tei — absent from the FY2025 report. · Open the full document →
Tinjauan Operasional / Operational Review — p. 128 · Read the full section →
The portfolio as management framed it a year earlier, before Beauty & Wellness disappeared from the vertical structure.
FY2024's pull-quote names four verticals, including Erajaya Beauty & Wellness.
“Erajaya Group engages in its business activities as importers, distributors, and retailers of telecommunication devices. By basing its business on customers, or “customercentric” business, the Company actively expands its business lines by opening new categories through 4 business verticals,namely: Erajaya Digital, Erajaya Beauty & Wellness,Erajaya Active Lifestyle, and Erajaya Food & Nourishment.”
p. 128 · Read in context →
More annual reports
PT Erajaya Swasembada Tbk — 2023 Annual Report (Laporan Tahunan) — FY2023 · 518 pages · Four verticals and 2,049 outlets: the year net sales grew 21.6% and subsidiary Sinar Eka Selaras was floated on the IDX as ERAL. · Open →
PT Erajaya Swasembada Tbk — 2022 Annual Report (Laporan Tahunan) — FY2022 · 526 pages · The four-vertical structure at Rp49.5tn of net sales — the base year for everything the 2025 report compares against. · Open →
PT Erajaya Swasembada Tbk — 2021 Annual Report (Laporan Tahunan) — FY2021 · 478 pages · The year the Active Lifestyle (JD Sports JV, August 2021) and Beauty & Wellness (Caring Pharmacy JV, November 2021) verticals were created. · Open →
Competitors describe PT Erajaya Swasembada Tbk's market in their own filings and calls. These verified passages and visual pages show where their strategies meet, using source documents preserved in Sources.
Senheng New Retail Berhad (5305)
The only peer in this run's corpus that filed a readable document, and a genuine competitor: Malaysia's largest listed specialist chain for consumer electrical and electronics goods, operating 116 stores under the Senheng, Grand Senheng and senQ banners. Erajaya's Malaysian subsidiary CG Computers Sdn. Bhd. ended 2025 with 223 outlets there — 115 Urban Republic, 86 Switch (Apple Authorised Reseller), 10 Samsung Experience Stores, 8 Mi and 4 Huawei — so the two chains sit in the same Malaysian malls and street-level locations. The overlap is sharpest in Senheng's senQ format, which the company describes as carrying "a wider range of digital gadgets and smart electronics, predominantly in shopping malls," the assortment Urban Republic and Switch sell; it is thinner in Senheng's white-goods and home-appliance core, where Erajaya's comparable format (Erablue, 181 Indonesian stores at end-2025 against 87 a year earlier) is a domestic rather than a Malaysian business. Exhibits below are confined to the retail-competition material — the corporate profile, MD&A and the risk discussion. Senheng's sustainability statement, governance chapters and AGM notices, which are the bulk of the report, are excluded. Senheng does not name Erajaya anywhere in the document.
How Senheng names its competitive set in a filed risk disclosure: brick-and-mortar retailers, online marketplaces and e-commerce platforms, in that order and with no single rival singled out. Erajaya's Malaysian stores fall in the first bucket; Shopee and Lazada are the unnamed second and third. The stated response is the one that matters for the subject, because it is the same lever Erajaya pulls — affordability through instalment and flexible-ownership schemes (Senang Milik) plus bank and credit-card financing partnerships, rather than headline price. Read alongside the demand statement above it, this is a peer arguing that the post-2022 normalisation in electronics demand is a return to trend rather than a cyclical trough, and that the contested ground is payment terms and access, not discounting. It is the peer's characterisation of its own market and is not independently verified here.
Management Discussion and Analysis — Risks, Challenges, and Mitigation Strategies: The observed moderation in consumer expenditure reflects a normalization of purchasing habits following the surge in demand for home appliances and consumer electronics experienced during 2020-2022. […] The retail industry operates with intense competition, with Senheng facing significant competition from an array of market participants, including brick-and-mortar retailers, online marketplaces, and e-commerce platforms. To sustain its competitive advantage within this environment, Senheng is prioritizing the delivery of appealing value through afordability and flexible ownership solutions, such as our Senang Milik program, designed to facilitate access to essential products. The Group also actively collaborates with a diverse range of financial institutions, such as major banks and credit card providers, to ofer a comprehensive suite of flexible payment solutions and financing schemes, with the aim of providing superior value, convenience, and exceptional service. […] The retail sector is undergoing rapid technological transformation, driven by changing consumer preferences and new technologies. The Group must continuously adapt and innovate its business model, digital platforms, and operational processes to maintain a competitive edge.
p. 17 · Read in context →
The most directly comparable disclosure in the document: Senheng withdrawing from the small-format, mobile-focused store concept — the format Erajaya's Malaysian arm is built on — while adding large experiential stores. The network shrank from 125 to 116 outlets over FY2024, with Senheng Mobile phased out through Q1 2025, six stores upgraded or relocated and three large-format stores opened. Senheng frames this as quality over quantity; the report also records the write-off of fixed assets on the Senheng Mobile closure as one of the charges behind FY2024 net profit falling to RM11.0 million from RM25.0 million (p.16), so the retreat carried a cost. Against this, Erajaya's Malaysian gadget formats moved the other way in aggregate over 2025 — Switch from 83 to 86 outlets and Samsung Experience Stores from 9 to 10, with Urban Republic edging down from 117 to 115. The online figure is the other half of the picture: RM128.3 million, up 54%, but still only about a tenth of the group's RM1,216.9 million revenue, so this is a chain whose e-commerce is growing fast off a small base while its store count contracts.
Management Discussion and Analysis — Fortifying Omnichannel Leadership and Accelerating Digital Growth: In FY2024, we recalibrated our store portfolio, aligning with our focus on innovation, agility, and efective resource allocation. We took several key actions: closure of Senheng Mobile stores to right-size our earlier growth initiative involving small-format mobile-focused brand operation, phased out from FY2024 to the first quarter of 2025; upgrades or relocations of six existing stores; and opening of three new Grand Senheng, Grand Senheng Elite, and senQ stores. Our optimized network stood at 116 stores as at 31 December 2024 (compared to 125 at the end of 2023). […] Our eforts on boosting online market penetration yielded robust online sales growth, reaching RM128.3 million in FY2024, a 54% increase from RM83.5 million in the previous year, underscoring the efectiveness of our digital strategy.
p. 15 · Read in context →
Figures converted from Indonesian rupiah at historical FX rates — see data/company.json.fx_rates. Ratios, margins, and multiples are unitless and unchanged.
What Erajaya is
PT Erajaya Swasembada Tbk sold $4.60 billion of goods in 2025 and kept $71.8 million for its owners — 1.6 cents of every dollar [1]. It is a leading Indonesian importer, distributor and retailer of mobile devices — it runs the country's largest official Apple retail network [2] — now extending into sportswear, groceries and bubble tea. The market values the whole business at about $339 million, roughly four times trailing earnings and two-thirds of book value. The five-year record of cash generation explains most of that discount.
Erajaya buys phones from Apple, Samsung, Xiaomi and other principals, moves them through 70 wholesale distribution points and about 54,000 registered third-party resellers, and sells them through 2,333 of its own retail outlets [3] [4]. The retail estate is a mix of own-brand multi-brand stores and principal-branded shops it operates under licence: 1,104 erafone outlets, 206 iBox (Apple) stores, 181 Erablue electronics stores, 145 Samsung Experience Stores and 86 Mi stores in Indonesia, plus about 240 digital-retail outlets in Malaysia and Singapore [5]. Around that core sit three declared verticals: Erajaya Digital (phones, laptops, operator products), Erajaya Active Lifestyle (Urban Republic, JD Sports, MST Golf, Asics, Anta, DJI, Garmin, and XPENG electric vehicles) and Erajaya Food and Nourishment (Paris Baguette, Chagee, Wetzel's Pretzels, GrandLucky Superstore) [6]. Employees number 6,061, with a further 11,847 contractor and subcontractor staff [7].
FY2025 Net Sales ($m)
Profit to Owners ($m)
Market Value ($m)
Price / Trailing Earnings
Sources: FY2025 Annual Report, Key Financial Data Overview [8] and Stock Overview [9]; H1 2026 interim statements [10]; closing price of $0.0212 on 28 July 2026 [11]. Market value uses the 15.95 billion shares in issue. Trailing earnings are FY2025 owner earnings less H1 2025 plus H1 2026; the multiple is computed in rupiah, where trailing earnings are Rp89.77 per share.
Where the gross profit comes from
Phones and tablets are 78% of sales and 63% of gross profit [12] [13]. They carry an 8.8% gross margin, down from 9.5% the year before. The "accessories and others" line — which is where the lifestyle, apparel, food and beverage businesses sit — is 15.6% of sales at a 23.1% gross margin, and it supplied 33% of group gross profit in 2025 against 27.8% in 2024 [14]. That shift is the arithmetic behind management's diversification story, and it is real: gross profit from the accessories and others line grew 36% in a year while phone gross profit grew 6%.
Source: FY2025 Annual Report, Note 35 Segment Information [15]. Margins and gross-profit shares derived from the reported segment table.
The industry backdrop is genuinely favourable and management describes it plainly: Indonesian smartphone shipments above 40 million units in 2025, 5G device share rising from 25.8% to roughly 35%, and the premium segment recovering after the iPhone 16 series won local-content approval in March 2025 [16]. Rising average selling prices lift Erajaya's revenue almost mechanically. They do not, by themselves, lift the margin on each unit.
From $4.60 billion to $71.8 million
The income statement is a thin funnel. Gross profit of $501 million (10.9% of sales) is reduced by $230 million of selling and distribution costs and $167 million of general and administrative costs, leaving $146 million of operating profit — 3.2% of sales — after $45 million of other income [17]. Finance costs of $38.5 million then take 26% of that operating profit, tax takes $32.5 million, and minority holders in the listed and unlisted subsidiaries take $7.0 million. $71.8 million reaches the parent's owners, or $0.00454 per share [18].
Two of the larger cost lines are worth naming because they are structural to Indonesian device retail rather than discretionary: $45.0 million of depreciation on leased store space and $34.3 million spent on credit-card instalment sales programmes. Together they consume 15.8% of group gross profit [19].
Sources: FY2023 Annual Report, Summary of Key Financial Data for FY2021–FY2023 [20]; FY2025 Annual Report, Key Financial Data Overview [21]. Margins derived from reported sales, gross profit, operating profit and profit attributable to owners.
The gross margin has sat in a narrow band between 10.7% and 11.1% for five years [22] [23]. The operating margin fell from 3.8% to 3.2% over the same period, and the owner net margin from 2.3% to 1.6%, because the store estate and the interest bill grew faster than gross profit. Sales rose 76% between 2021 and 2025 in rupiah; profit to owners rose 18%.
What the market has paid
Erajaya was a market favourite in 2021. At the end of the second quarter of that year the shares closed at $0.0483 and the company was worth $770 million [24]. At $0.0212 on 28 July 2026 it is worth $339 million [25]. Sales over the same stretch went from $3.04 billion to $4.60 billion [26] [27]. Across 2023, 2024 and 2025 the shares traded in a band between $0.0187 and $0.0354 and ended each year within $0.0024 of $0.0240 [28] [29].
Sources: Stock Highlights tables in the FY2021 [30], FY2023 [31] and FY2025 [32] Annual Reports; sales from the FY2023 [33] and FY2025 [34] Annual Reports.
The arithmetic at $0.0212 is undemanding. Trailing twelve-month earnings per share of $0.00513 — FY2025's $0.00454 less the $0.00216 earned in the first half of 2025 plus the $0.00275 earned in the first half of 2026 — put the shares on 4.3 times earnings in rupiah terms [35] [36]. Equity attributable to owners was $521 million at 30 June 2026, so the market pays 0.65 times book [37]. Sell-side coverage is uniformly positive, with a mean twelve-month target of $0.0277 [38]. The pessimism is in the multiple, not in the published forecasts.
Where the capital sits
The reason for the multiple is on the balance sheet and in the cash flow statement rather than in the earnings line. Over the five years to 2025 Erajaya reported $352 million of profit and collected $239 million of net operating cash, against $226 million spent on fixed assets — leaving $13 million of free cash flow across five years of reported profit [39] [40] [41] [42]. Lease payments of $51.5 million in 2025 sit below that line, in financing [43]; charge them where a store operator would feel them and the five-year total turns firmly negative.
Sources: consolidated cash flow statements in the FY2022 [44], FY2023 [45] and FY2025 [46] Annual Reports; profit for the year from the FY2023 [47] and FY2025 [48] Annual Reports. Profit includes non-controlling interests; capex is acquisitions of fixed assets and advances for their purchase. Each year is converted at its own period-end rate, so the dollar series also carries five years of rupiah depreciation.
FY2025 is the sharpest illustration. Operating cash flow fell to $13.5 million from $138.8 million, because inventories rose 63% to $699 million and total assets rose 32.5% [49] [50]. Short-term bank loans nearly doubled to $299 million to fund it [51]. Total liabilities reached 1.84 times equity and the current ratio slipped to 1.16 [52].
A second, more unusual claim on capital sits in the tax line. Erajaya imports, and Indonesian import withholding tax (Article 22) is levied on the value of goods rather than on profit. In 2025 the parent company alone credited $99.3 million of Article 22 tax against a current tax charge of $9.1 million, generating a refund claim of $93.0 million for that year alone [53]. Consolidated estimated claims for tax refund stood at $217.7 million at end-2025, against $225.6 million a year earlier — the rupiah balance was essentially unchanged [54]. Old claims are collected and new ones replace them; the balance behaves like a permanent, non-interest-bearing loan to the state worth 40% of owners' equity and 59% of the market value of the company. At 30 June 2026 essentially all of it — $192.5 million of a $193.2 million total — had been reclassified as non-current, meaning the company no longer expects to recover it within twelve months [55].
Sources: FY2025 Annual Report, Consolidated Statement of Financial Position [56] and Equity [57]; 30 June 2026 interim statements, assets [58], liabilities [59] and equity [60]. Interest-bearing debt sums short-term bank loans, current maturities of long-term bank loans and bonds, and non-current bank loans. Each date is converted at its own rate, so dollar movements include the change in the rupiah.
The strongest fact against reading that as a permanent trap is the most recent one. In the six months to June 2026 the working-capital cycle ran the other way: operating cash flow was positive $102.5 million, against negative $294.7 million in the same period of 2025 [61]. Erajaya used it to repay $75.7 million of bank debt, redeem $37.9 million of bonds and buy back $5.4 million of its own shares [62]. Interest-bearing debt excluding leases fell from $491 million to $339 million and the remaining bank borrowing was termed out, with non-current bank loans rising from $27.8 million to $129.0 million [63]. Half-year sales rose 22.4% to $2,359 million, operating profit 28.3% to $79.1 million, and profit to owners 38.0% to $43.1 million [64] [65].
Six months is one turn of a seasonal cycle, and inventories were still higher in June 2026 than in December 2025 in rupiah terms [66]. The read that fits the evidence is that Erajaya's cash generation is cyclical around a low average rather than absent, and that the discount to book has more to do with how much capital the growth consumes than with doubt about the earnings themselves. Two consecutive years in which operating cash flow, after lease payments, covers capital expenditure and the dividend would settle it; a repeat of 2025's inventory build funded by short-term bank lines would settle it the other way.
Who owns it
PT Eralink Internasional held 55.17% of the shares at the end of 2025, up from 54.51% at the start of the year — the controlling holder added 105.3 million shares during a year in which the stock went nowhere [67]. The annual report names the ultimate beneficial owner as Ms Rebecca Halim [68], and the boards are drawn substantially from the founding family: Budiarto Halim is President Director, Alexander Halim Kusuma President Commissioner [69]. The public float is 43.94% and treasury stock 0.88% [70]; foreign institutions hold 19.24% [71]. A buyback authorised for 2025 was deliberately not executed, which management attributed to market conditions and capital-allocation priorities; a $5.4 million repurchase did follow in the first half of 2026 [72] [73]. Dividends paid in 2025 were $18.0 million, 29% of the previous year's profit attributable to owners [74].
The question this report follows
Erajaya has grown net sales from $3.04 billion to $4.60 billion in five years while its market value fell from $770 million to $339 million. The question this report follows is whether that growth can be converted into cash for owners at a rate that justifies more than the 0.65 times book value and roughly four times earnings the market currently pays — given that the inventory, tax receivables and short-term bank debt the growth requires absorbed almost all of the reported profit over the same period.
Everything that follows bears on one side of that arithmetic or the other: the durability of the phone franchise and the economics of the newer verticals; how much of the balance sheet is genuinely recoverable; what the family that controls 55% of the shares does with the capital; and what has to be true for the discount to close.
Figures converted from Indonesian rupiah at historical FX rates — see data/company.json.fx_rates. Ratios, margins, and multiples are unitless and unchanged. Growth rates quoted in the prose are computed in rupiah; because the rupiah weakened over the period, dollar figures compound more slowly than those rates imply.
What three years of accounts show
Erajaya's sales grew 12.9% a year over FY2023–FY2025 and profit attributable to owners grew 20.3% a year, but the trading margin did not improve: operating profit before the "other income" line was flat between FY2024 and FY2025, and almost all of the increase in reported operating profit came from foreign-exchange gains and an undisclosed residual. The half year to 30 June 2026 is much stronger than the annual record and much stronger than consensus, which still models FY2026 revenue below the twelve months already reported.
Sales CAGR FY2023-FY2025
Owner Profit CAGR FY2023-FY2025
FY2025 Owner Net Margin
Trailing EPS to Jun 2026 ($)
Sources: FY2025 Annual Report, Key Financial Data Overview [1]; H1 2026 interim statements [2]. Growth rates and trailing earnings derived from reported figures; trailing EPS is FY2025 less H1 2025 plus H1 2026.
The income statement, line by line
The three audited years and the two most recent half years sit below in one frame. Sales rose from $3.91 billion in FY2023 to $4.60 billion in FY2025 [3], and profit attributable to owners from $53.7 million to $71.8 million [4] [5]. Basic earnings per share moved $0.0034, $0.0041, $0.0045.
Sources: FY2025 Annual Report, Consolidated Statement of Profit or Loss [6] and attribution [7]; audited FY2023 statements [8] [9]; 30 June 2026 interim statements, sales and operating profit [10] and profit attributable to owners [11]. Converted from rupiah at fiscal-period rates, so lines may not sum exactly. Finance income and associates combines the two lines as reported.
Three features carry through. The gross margin sits in a narrow band — 10.72%, 11.15%, 10.90% — so gross profit tracks volume, not pricing power. Operating expenses grew faster than gross profit in FY2025: gross profit added $64.5 million while selling, distribution, general and administrative costs added $63.0 million. And the share of profit leaking to minority holders is rising, from 3.6% of group profit in FY2023 [12] to 8.9% in FY2025 [13] and 10.1% in H1 2026 [14].
Where the extra operating profit came from
Strip the "other income" line out of operating profit and the picture changes. Trading operating profit — gross profit less selling, distribution, general and administrative costs, less other expenses — was $100.9 million in FY2023, $104.8 million in FY2024 and $100.9 million in FY2025. That is a 0.6% decline in the year sales grew 17.4%, and a fall in the trading margin from 2.59% to 2.19% of sales.
Source: derived from the consolidated statements of profit or loss, FY2025 Annual Report [15] and audited FY2023 statements [16]. Trading operating profit is operating profit less other income.
Reported operating profit rose $18.2 million in FY2025. Other income rose $18.7 million. The note behind that line shows what moved: a net foreign-exchange gain of $12.2 million against $1.2 million the year before, and an "Others" residual of $11.2 million against $5.3 million [17]. Those two items together supplied $17.1 million, or 94% of the increase in operating profit. Promotion support from suppliers — the item most tied to the trading business — added only $1.6 million.
Sources: FY2025 Annual Report, Note 29 Other Income [18]; audited FY2023 statements, Note 29 [19]. $ million. The residual column folds in gains and losses on fixed-asset disposals, lease write-offs and the undisclosed "Others" line.
The same pattern runs through the first half of 2026. Operating profit rose $17.4 million year on year; other income rose $10.6 million of that, with the foreign-exchange gain up $1.7 million and the "Others" residual up $5.8 million to $8.8 million [20]. Trading operating profit did grow — $52.6 million to $55.1 million, up 14.2% in rupiah — but on 22.4% sales growth, so the trading margin still slipped, from 2.50% to 2.33%.
The strongest fact against reading this as low-quality earnings is that foreign-exchange gains on an importer's dollar payables are a real economic outcome, not an accrual: Erajaya buys in dollars and sells in rupiah, so a firmer rupiah genuinely lowers the landed cost of inventory. What is not established is repeatability. A currency gain is a price outcome the company does not control, and the "Others" residual — $11.2 million in FY2025, $8.8 million in six months — is disclosed as a single unexplained figure. My read is that the FY2025 profit growth should be treated as substantially non-recurring until a year appears in which trading operating profit itself grows; the evidence that would settle it is a full year of the "Others" line broken out, or an FY2026 in which trading operating profit grows at least in line with sales.
Cash against reported profit
Over the three years, reported profit and operating cash flow are close in total — $203.9 million against $209.6 million — but neither the year-by-year path nor the after-investment position is comfortable.
Sources: FY2025 Annual Report, Consolidated Statement of Cash Flows [21]; audited FY2023 statements, operating and investing [22] and financing [23]; 30 June 2026 interim cash flow statement, operating and investing [24] and lease liabilities in financing [25]. Lease payments sit in financing activities, so operating cash flow is stated before them.
Lease payments are the adjustment that matters for a retailer with this store estate. Erajaya paid $144.4 million of lease liabilities across the three years, all of it classified as financing. Deduct those and the three-year capital expenditure of $164.0 million from $209.6 million of operating cash, and the group consumed $98.8 million of cash over FY2023–FY2025 while reporting $203.9 million of profit. The five-year version of that arithmetic sits in Business and Balance Sheet; the three-year window with leases included is worse, not better.
The second gap is tax. The income statement charged $82.3 million of tax across the three years; the cash flow statement shows $237.1 million actually paid [26] [27]. The difference is the Article 22 import withholding regime: the parent alone credited $99.3 million of Article 22 tax in FY2025 against a current tax charge of $9.1 million [28]. The balance sheet carries the result: $86.4 million of current and $131.2 million of non-current estimated claims for tax refund, plus $109.4 million of prepaid taxes, at 31 December 2025 [29]. Whether that $327 million is collectible on the terms the accounts assume is the asset-quality question this chapter does not resolve; what it does establish is that reported earnings and cash have been separated by tax timing, not only by working capital.
H1 2026 is the counter-evidence. Operating cash flow of $102.5 million covered capex of $23.9 million and lease payments of $27.1 million [30] with $51.5 million to spare, and cash taxes paid fell to $12.0 million from $42.3 million a year earlier [31].
The half year just filed
Sales for the six months to 30 June 2026 were $2.36 billion against $2.10 billion, up 22.4% in rupiah; profit attributable to owners was $43.1 million against $34.1 million, up 38.0%; earnings per share $0.0028 against $0.0022 [32] [33]. The effective tax rate fell to 24.1% from 29.8% [34].
Part of that growth is a change in the consolidation perimeter rather than trading. PT Era Blu Elektronik — the Erablue electronics venture — appears as a 55.00%-owned subsidiary at 30 June 2026 with total assets before eliminations of $108.3 million, against no holding shown for 2025 [35]. Its $16.7 million carrying cost left the joint-venture line on the change of control [36], and it now carries $18.2 million of the $80.6 million minority-interest balance [37]. By product line, computers and consumer electronics rose 80.6% and Active and Lifestyle goods rose 244.8%, against 16.7% for cellular phones and tablets [38]. The interim statements do not disclose how much revenue Erablue contributed after consolidation, so the organic growth rate cannot be separated from the filings. That is a real limit on extrapolating the half.
Supplier mix also moved. Purchases from Apple South Asia fell to $753.6 million, 31.94% of consolidated net sales, from $995.7 million and 47.35% a year earlier, while Samsung purchases rose to $388.3 million, or 16.46% [39].
Consensus against the run rate
The consensus set carried in this report is dated 29 July 2026: FY2026 revenue of $4.41 billion and earnings per share of $0.0044, FY2027 revenue of $4.62 billion and earnings per share of $0.0054, with a mean twelve-month target of $0.0277 and no sell ratings in any of the compilations. Those figures sit against a scheduled reporting date of 30 July 2026, and the corpus does not establish whether individual analysts had already marked their models to the interim statements already lodged.
Sources: actuals from the FY2025 Annual Report [40] and the 30 June 2026 interim statements, sales and profit for the period [41]; FY2026 and FY2027 lines are consensus estimates compiled for this report, dated 29 July 2026. Trailing twelve months is FY2025 less H1 2025 plus H1 2026.
The arithmetic of the gap is straightforward. Trailing twelve-month revenue of $4.65 billion already exceeds the FY2027 consensus revenue line of $4.62 billion, and trailing earnings per share of $0.0049 sits 12.8% above the FY2026 consensus of $0.0044. For the FY2026 revenue estimate to hold, the second half must deliver $2.05 billion — 10.3% below the $2.49 billion of H2 2025 and 13.1% below the half just reported. For the earnings estimate to hold, second-half earnings per share must be $0.0016, against $0.0024 in H2 2025: a 25.7% fall year on year and a 41.1% fall from the half just reported. The second half has been the weaker half on earnings per share in two of the three years available and on revenue in one [42], so a softer H2 is not itself unusual — but the largest sequential decline in the record is 2.9% on revenue, in H2 2024, and 19.9% on earnings per share, in H2 2023. The consensus implies a step down several times larger than either.
Sources: half-year sales from the 30 June 2024 [43] and 30 June 2026 [44] interim statements; full-year sales from the FY2025 Annual Report [45] and audited FY2023 statements [46]. Second-half figures are full year less first half; the final bar is the FY2026 consensus revenue estimate less reported H1 2026. Each half is converted at its own period rate.
The FY2027 estimate is internally different in character. Revenue growth of 4.8% on the FY2026 base with earnings per share up 22.5% implies profit to owners of roughly $84.2 million on $4.62 billion of sales — an owner net margin near 1.82%, above anything the group has posted for a full year, though H1 2026 ran at 1.83%. So the FY2026 number understates a revenue line the company has already passed, while the FY2027 number leans on a margin the company has only held for six months.
Price / Trailing EPS
Price / FY2026 Consensus EPS
Price / FY2027 Consensus EPS
Price / Book, 30 Jun 2026
Sources: closing price of $0.0212 on 28 July 2026 [47]; equity attributable to owners of the parent of $521.4 million at 30 June 2026 on 15.95 billion shares in issue [48]; earnings per share as tabulated above. Multiples derived.
At $0.0212 the market pays 4.3 times what the company has already earned in the last twelve months and 0.65 times the book value of the equity owners hold. The gap between the consensus multiple of 4.85 times and the trailing multiple of 4.30 times is the difference between an estimate dated before the interim filing and earnings already reported.
What would change the read
Three checks are specific enough to settle, each against a named line in a filing.
Trading operating profit for FY2026 — operating profit less other income, from the consolidated statement of profit or loss. It ran at $55.1 million in H1 2026 against $100.9 million for all of FY2025. A full year above roughly $107 million would mean the trading business, not the currency, is doing the work; a year near $94 million would confirm that three years of profit growth have come from items outside the trade.
The "Others" line inside Note 29. It reached $11.2 million in FY2025 and $8.8 million in six months without a breakdown. A disclosed composition, or a year in which it recedes toward the $4.2 million of FY2023, would resolve how much of reported operating profit is durable.
Second-half sales and earnings per share against the consensus-implied $2.05 billion and $0.0016. The FY2026 annual report settles both, and the quarterly filings settle them sooner. A second half merely level with H2 2025 puts FY2026 earnings per share near $0.0049, which is where the trailing figure already sits.
One limitation is worth stating plainly: live web research was unavailable during this pass, so post-filing analyst revisions, any company guidance issued alongside the interim statements, and the market's reaction to them could not be checked. The corpus contains no earnings-call transcripts for Erajaya, so management's own account of the half is not quotable here.
Figures converted from Indonesian rupiah at historical FX rates — see data/company.json.fx_rates. Ratios, margins, and multiples are unitless and unchanged.
What the state owes Erajaya
The second-largest asset Erajaya owns is money the Indonesian tax office is holding: $193 million of estimated claims for tax refund at 30 June 2026, plus $107 million of prepaid taxes. Together that is 57.6% of equity attributable to owners and 88.7% of the company's market value. The multi-year record shows the claims come back at close to face value — and that they have never come back fast enough to stop the pile growing.
Erajaya imports. Indonesian Article 22 withholding tax is levied on the value of goods crossing the border, not on the profit earned selling them, and a distributor whose parent-company taxable income is a thin slice of import value will overpay every year by construction. In 2025 the parent credited $99.3 million of Article 22 tax against a current tax charge of $9.1 million — it prepaid 10.9 times what it owed — and booked the $93.0 million difference as a refund claim for the year [1]. In 2024 the ratio was 19.6 times: $87.6 million credited against $4.5 million charged [1]. This is not a one-off dispute or a contested assessment. It is the arithmetic of the business model meeting the arithmetic of the tax code.
Refund Claims, 30 Jun 2026 ($m)
Of Owners' Equity
Of Market Value
Annual Interest Equivalent ($m)
Sources: consolidated statement of financial position at 30 June 2026 [2] and Note 22 Equity [3]; interest equivalent derived at the midpoint of the 6.50%-7.25% Rupiah bank-loan rates disclosed for 2025 [4]; market value of $339 million on 15,950,000,000 shares.
How the balance grew
The pile was not always this size. In the IPO offering memorandum, consolidated estimated claims for tax refund were $2.1 million at 31 December 2008, $1.0 million at 31 December 2010 and $0.3 million at 30 June 2011 [5]. Claims were then a rounding error against a business that recovered its withholding inside the year.
Sources: consolidated statements of financial position, FY2022 Annual Report [6], FY2023 Annual Report [7], FY2025 Annual Report [8] and the 30 June 2026 interim statements [2].
The step change happened in one year. The balance was $83.4 million at the end of 2022 and $125.8 million at the end of 2023 [7]. It reached $225.6 million at the end of 2024 and has sat near that level since [8]. The vintage tables explain it: at the end of 2023 the parent carried one year's claim, the 2023 vintage of $83.0 million [9]. At the end of 2024 it carried two, the 2023 vintage of $79.1 million and the 2024 vintage of $86.8 million [10]. Nothing was written off; the recovery cycle simply lengthened by a year, and two years of claims have been outstanding at every balance sheet date since.
One reading of the June 2026 balance sheet deserves correcting. Almost the whole block — $192.5 million of $193.2 million — sits in non-current assets [2]. That is not a new judgement about collectability. It is the normal state: 99.7% was non-current at 31 December 2022 and 98.5% at 31 December 2023 [6] [7]. A claim becomes current only once the tax office issues its assessment letter, and those letters arrived on 12 December 2024 and 11 December 2025 — which is why the two most recent December balance sheets showed a current chunk and the June one does not [11].
The collection record
On the evidence in the filings, this is a good receivable. The tax office has assessed the parent's last two claims within a whisker of what was claimed, and the money has followed.
Sources: Note 31 Taxation, Tax Assessment Letters, 30 June 2026 interim statements [11] [12]; FY2025 Annual Report Note 31 [13]. Parent claim-year timing derived from the vintage tables.
The parent claimed $83.0 million for fiscal 2023 and was assessed $82.9 million — a shortfall of $95,000, or 0.114%, charged to income tax expense [13]. For fiscal 2024 it claimed $86.74 million and was assessed $86.73 million, a shortfall of about $1,900 on $87 million [11]. Once assessed, subsidiaries were paid in one to two months: TAM's $25.1 million was assessed on 24 June 2025 and paid on 21 July 2025 [13]. Older vintages clear too — the subsidiary tail from 2020, 2021 and 2022 has worked its way off the table [10].
The one contested case cuts the other way and should be named. Subsidiary SES claimed a $1.30 million refund for fiscal 2024 and instead received an underpayment assessment of $5,400; it lodged an objection with the Directorate General of Taxes on 19 May 2026 and had no decision as at the reporting date [12]. That is a claim rejected in full. It is also $1.3 million — 0.6% of the block. A pattern of denials on that scale would matter; a single one at this size does not.
Money out, money in
What the balance does not do is shrink. The parent's claim for a year is settled roughly two years after the withholding is paid, by which time one or two further years have accrued behind it.
Sources: claim arising per year from Note 31 vintage tables, FY2023 Annual Report [9], FY2024 Annual Report [10], FY2025 Annual Report [14] and the 30 June 2026 interim statements [15]; refunds collected derived as the year-on-year fall in each vintage.
Two periods stand out. In 2024 the parent collected nothing: its 2023 vintage went from $79.2 million to $79.1 million over the year, and the $93,000 difference was the assessment shortfall booked to tax expense, not cash [9] [10]. That is the year the block doubled. In the first half of 2026 the opposite happened and the block still barely moved: $76.9 million of the 2024 vintage came back, while a new 2026 claim of $71.8 million accrued in the same six months, leaving the consolidated balance down $6.3 million at $193.2 million [15].
Six months of 2026 generated 84% of a full 2025's claim. If the second half accrues at the same rate, the 2026 vintage lands near $143 million against $93 million for 2025, and the block moves above $220 million before the 2025 vintage is collected. Growth in imports is what feeds it, so the balance scales with sales rather than mean-reverting.
This also makes the cash tax line hard to read on its own. Income taxes paid were $128.2 million in 2024 and $35.5 million in 2025 [16], then $42.3 million in the first half of 2025 against $12.0 million in the first half of 2026 [17]. Those swings track when refunds landed, not whether the withholding slowed.
What the float costs
At 30 June 2026 the group carried $338.7 million of interest-bearing debt excluding leases against $72.2 million of cash [18] [2]. The refund claims alone equal 57% of that debt; add the $107.1 million of prepaid taxes and the tax authorities hold the equivalent of 89% of everything Erajaya has borrowed [2].
Rupiah bank facilities carried 6.50% to 7.25% during 2025 [4]. Applying that band to the $193.2 million of claims gives $12.6 million to $14.0 million a year of interest that would not be paid if the money were in the bank — against $71.8 million of profit attributable to owners in 2025 [19], and against $31.6 million of group interest expense before lease interest [20]. Roughly a fifth of what the owners earn, and close to half the group's interest bill, is the price of a two-year interest-free loan to the state. No interest compensation on the refunds appears anywhere in the filings.
The same fact shows up in the return on equity. Profit attributable to owners of $71.8 million on $548.5 million of owners' equity at the end of 2025 is 13.1% [19] [21]. Measured against the $330.8 million of equity left after setting the refund claims aside, it is 21.7%. The trading business earns a respectable return; a third of the capital behind it is parked. That decomposition is illustrative rather than exact — the block is funded by a mix of debt, payables and equity, not by equity alone — but it locates where the shortfall between a 13% return and a 22% one comes from.
What a haircut would actually do
For an investor buying at 0.65 times book, what matters is how much of that discount is protection against the block being worth less than stated. Not much of it, on this arithmetic: the block would have to be badly wrong before the multiple stopped looking low.
Source: derived from equity attributable to owners of $521.4 million and 15,950,000,000 shares at 30 June 2026 [3], applying stated write-downs to the $193.2 million of refund claims [2].
Writing off a quarter of the block takes price-to-book from 0.65 to 0.72. Writing off the whole of it — against an observed assessment record of 0.114% and 0.002% shortfalls — takes it to 1.03. The credit question, on the evidence available, is close to settled; the discount to book is not compensation for it.
The read this chapter supports is that the refund claims are a duration problem, not a solvency or accounting one. They convert at par, on a cycle of roughly two years, and they grow with imports — which means they consume cash permanently while the business expands and would release $193 million, more than half the market value, only if growth stopped or the withholding mechanism changed. The strongest fact against that read is the SES objection: one subsidiary claim was denied in full and remains unresolved, and if that becomes a pattern rather than an exception the credit assumption underneath everything above weakens. Three things in the next two filings would settle it. Whether the 2025 vintage of $93.0 million receives its assessment letter around December 2026, which would confirm the two-year cycle rather than a lengthening one. Whether the 2026 vintage annualises near $143 million, which would push the block past $220 million. And how the Directorate General of Taxes rules on the SES objection.
The cash that never reaches owners in this business is not lost to weak margins alone — a meaningful share of it is on deposit with the Indonesian tax office, earning nothing, and financed at 7%.